No passado dia 9 de setembro de 2024, foi publicado o relatório sobre «O Futuro da Competitividade Europeia», da autoria de Mário Draghi. O “Relatório Draghi”, como vem sendo conhecido, traça um cenário pessimista para o crescimento e a competitividade da economia europeia, recomendando investimentos avultados para colmatar o fosso de inovação face aos EUA.
Com um capítulo setorial dedicado à “digitalização e tecnologias avançadas“, o Relatório começa por destacar que, apesar de os avanços tecnológicos se sucederam a um ritmo acelerado, a Europa perdeu em grande medida a revolução digital e os ganhos de produtividade que esta trouxe. Na verdade, segundo Draghi, as diferenças de produtividade existentes entre a União Europeia e os Estados Unidos da América devem-se em grande parte ao setor tecnológico. O Relatório refere que a UE «é fraca nas tecnologias emergentes que irão impulsionar o crescimento futuro. Apenas quatro das 50 maiores empresas tecnológicas mundiais são europeias».
Algumas passagens do Relatório em destaque:
The key driver of the rising productivity gap between the EU and the US has been digital technology (“tech”) – and Europe currently looks set to fall further behind. The main reason EU productivity diverged from the US in the mid-1990s was Europe’s failure to capitalise on the first digital revolution led by the internet – both in terms of generating new tech companies and diffusing digital tech into the economy. In fact, if we exclude the tech sector, EU productivity growth over the past twenty years would be broadly at par with the US. Europe is lagging in the breakthrough digital technologies that will drive growth in the future. Around 70% of foundational AI models have been developed in the US since 2017 and just three US “hyperscalers” account for over 65% of the global as well as of the European cloud market. The largest European cloud operator accounts for just 2% of the EU market. Quantum computing is poised to be the next major innovation, but five of the top ten tech companies globally in terms of quantum investment are based in the US and four in China. None are based in the EU.
While some digital sectors are likely already “lost”, Europe still has an opportunity to capitalise on future waves of digital innovation. The EU’s competitive disadvantage will likely widen in cloud computing, as the market is characterised by continuous massive investments, economies of scale and multiple services offered by a single provider. However, there are multiple reasons why Europe should not give up on developing its domestic tech sector. First, it is important that EU companies maintain a foothold in areas where technological sovereignty is required, such as security and encryption (“sovereign cloud” solutions). Second, a weak tech sector will hinder innovation performance in a wide range of adjacent fields, such as pharma, energy, materials and defence. Third, AI – and particularly generative AI – is an evolving technology in which EU companies still have an opportunity to carve out a leading position in selected segments. Europe holds a strong position in autonomous robotics, hosting around 22% of worldwide activity, and in AI services, hosting around 17% of activity. But innovative digital companies are generally failing to scale up in Europe and attract finance, reflected in a huge gap in later-stage financing between the EU and the US. In fact, there is no EU company with a market capitalisation over EUR 100 billion that has been set up from scratch in the last fifty years, while in the US all six companies with a valuation above EUR 1 trillion have been created over this period.
Integrating AI ‘vertically’ into European industry will be a critical factor in unlocking higher productivity. Quantitative estimates of the effects of AI on aggregate productivity are still uncertainii. However, there are already clear signs that AI will revolutionise several industries in which Europe specialises and will be crucial for EU companies ’ ability to remain leaders in their sector. For example, AI will radically change the pharma sector via so-called “combination products” – therapeutic and diagnostic products combining drugs, devices and biological components – which integrate medicine delivery systems with AI algorithms and process feedback data in real time. Gains of USD 60-110 billion per year are estimated from the use cases of AI in the pharma and medical device industries. AI will likewise transform the automotive sector, as AI-powered (generative) algorithms enhance vehicle design by optimising structures and components, improve performance and reduce material use, and optimise supply chains by predicting demand and streamlining logistics operations. AI is expected to reduce inventories in the automotive sector, accelerate the time to market from R&I and increase labour productivity. AI uptake in freight and passenger transport will enable increasingly automated functions to deliver safety and quality, navigation and route optimisation, predictive maintenance and fuel or power reduction.The energy sector is already heavily deploying AI, with more than 50 use cases today ranging from grid maintenance to load forecasting. Large gains are however still available: estimates of the market value for future AI applications in the sector reach USD 13 billion.
Although technology is crucial to protect Europe’s social model, AI could also undermine it without a strong focus on skills. AI is already a source of anxiety for European workers: almost 70% of respondents in a recent survey favoured government restrictions on AI to protect jobs. The impact of AI in Europe has so far been labour-enhancing rather than labour-replacing: there is a positive association between AI exposure and the sector-occupation employment share. However, this association may be transitory as businesses are still in the early stage of understanding how to deploy these technologies. Research from the US finds that around 80% of the workforce could have at least 10% of their work tasks affected by the introduction of the large language modules, while almost 20% of workers could see at least 50% of their tasks affectedv. Unlike previous waves of computerisation, the jobs of higher-skilled workers are likely to be more exposed. Providing workers with adequate skills and training to make use of AI can nevertheless help to make the benefits of AI more inclusive. In one recent study, access to AI assistance was found to increase productivity for all workers, but less experienced or low-skilled staff benefitted the most. While Europe should strive to match the US in innovative potential, it should aim to exceed it in providing opportunities for education and lifelong learning – ensuring that the benefits of AI are widely shared and any negative impacts on social inclusion are minimised.